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Tax-Adjusted Discount Rates
with Investor Taxes and Risky Debt
Ian A. Cooper and Kjell G. Nyborg*
This paper derives a tax-adjusted discount rate formula with a constant proportion leverage policy,
investor taxes, and risky debt. The result depends on an assumption about the treatment of tax
losses in default. We identify the assumption that justiftes the textbook approach of discounting
interest tax shields at the cost of debt. We contrast this with an alternative assumption that leads
to the Sick (1990) result that these should be discounted at the riskless rate. These two approaches
represent polar cases. Each generates its results by using a different simplifying assumption, and
we explain what determines the correct treatment in practice. We also discuss implementation of
the valuation procedure using the capital asset pricing model.
The treatment of the tax saving from debt in company valuation has recently been of renewed
interest (Fernandez, 2004; Cooper and Nyborg, 2006). However, there is still no standard approach
to calculating tax-adjusted discount rates when debt is risky. There are two factors that complicate
the analysis: 1) the yield spread on corporate debt and 2) investor taxes. The yield spread can be
a significant part of the cost of capital for some firms, especially with the high leverage and low
equity risk premia that are often used. Investor taxes can also have a significant impact. Evidence
from the United States prior to the tax reforms of 2003 is inconclusive about the degree to which
investor taxes offset the corporate tax advantage to borrowing. Fama and French (1998) present
empirical evidence consistent with a large impact of investor taxes, whereas Kemsley and Nissim
(2002) find little efFect. ' However, the recent changes to the US Tax Code have increased the
impact of investor taxes on the value of leveraged firms. Also, countries with imputation taxes
have an efFect of investor taxes built directly into their tax systems (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).
There are several alternative approaches to these issues. Assuming a constant leverage ratio.
Miles and Ezzell (1980) derive a well-known formula for tax-adjusted discount rates. The Miles-
Ezzell ("ME") formula allows for risky debt, but not investor taxes. Taggart (1991) derives a
variation of it that allows for investor taxes but assumes that corporate debt is riskless. Sick
(1990) develops a valuation formula that takes into account both investor taxes and the yield
spread on debt. He contrasts this with a version of the ME formula given in Brealey and Myers
(2003), which includes an adjustment for investor taxes. According to Sick, the formula given by
Brealey and Myers (2003) differs from his " . . . by the incorrect treatment of risky debt, as well as
the failure to recognize that tax shields should be discounted at a cost of equity..." (Sick, 1990,
We are grateful to an anonymous referee. Huang Wei Bin. and Bill Christie (the editor) for helpful suggestions. All
remaining errors are ours.
'Ian A. Cooper is Professor at the London Business School in London, UK. Kjell G. Nyborg is DnBNOR Professor of
Finance at the Norwegian School of Economics in Bergen, Norway and a research fellow ofCEPR.
'Graham (2000) finds that the net tax advantage to debt is less than the full corporate tax rate because of nondebt tax
shields. The valuation consequences of this are more complicated as it implies that the tax rate that should be used in
valuation is state and time dependent.
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p. 1441). The Sick approach is also different from the standard ME formula without investor
taxes. Sick's formula differs from theirs because he discounts tax shields at a different rate.
These different approaches can lead to economically significantly different discount rates and
values. Understanding when the various formulas apply is, therefore, important. In this paper,
we first clarify the source of the difference between the approaches of Sick (1990) and ME. We
describe the underlying assumptions that can be used to justify their different methods. Which
approach is appropriate depends upon the tax position of insolvent firms and the tax treatment of
debt write-downs. We then use the assumption that is consistent with the ME approach to derive
a formula for tax-adjusted discount rates that includes investor taxes and risky debt. The formula
is the same as Taggart's (1991) when debt is risk free. It is similar, but not identical, to Brealey
and Myers' (2003) formula. It turns out that Brealey and Myers' (2003) intuitive formula is not
exactly correct as it does not include all the effects of investor taxes. Finally, we provide consistent
expressions for the asset beta and discuss implementation using the capital asset pricing model
I. The Tax-Adjusted Discount Rate
We operate under the Miles and Ezzell (1980) leverage assumption that leverage is maintained
at a constant proportion of the market value of the firm. This is the most realistic simple leverage
policy, and also the one that is consistent with the use of the weighted average cost of capital
{WACC). The ME formula applies to any profile of cash flows as long as the company maintains
constant market value leverage. It provides a relationship between the leveraged discount rate,
Ri, and the unleveraged rate, Rij. We analyze a firm with expected pre-tax cash flows C,, at dates
t= 1 , . . . , r . Between these dates, leverage remains fixed. After each cash flow, leverage is reset
to a constant proportion, Z,, of the leveraged value of the firm. The two rates, Ru and RL, are
defined implicitly as the discount rates that give the correct unleveraged and leveraged values
when the after-tax operating cash flows are discounted:^
t=\,...,T (1)
i=r+l
r
Vu = Y. <^ '(1 - ^c)/(l + RLJ Í = 1,..., r, (2)
where Ft/, is the unleveraged value of the firm and Vu its leveraged value.
We assume that the representative investor has tax rates of Tpo on interest income and TPE
on the total of equity income and capital gains. The use of a single rate for equity returns is a
simplification, but our focus here is not the details of the investor tax system. Analysis of the
implications of differential investor income and capital gains rates can be found in Lewellen and
Lewellen (2005). With our assumptions, the increase in the after-tax cash flow to the representative
investor resulting from an incremental dollar of corporate interest is:
- (1 - Tc){\ - TPE). (3)
^More complex capital structure issues in the presence of investor taxes are discussed in Emery and Gehr (1988).
'We assume that tax is levied on the operating cash flows. A more complex treatment does not alter the results.
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This result is standard. We define the related variable, T*, by:
T* = Ts/i\ - Tpo). (4)
Thus:
(i-rc)(.-7-„)
1 -
Following Taggart (1991), we define the required return on riskless equity as
The first equality results from setting the after-investor-tax returns on riskless debt and riskless
equity equal to each other. The second equality follows from Equation (5). Note that if Tpo and
TpE are equal, then RFE = RF-
The equation that relates Ä y and/?i is one of the most important in valuation. It is used whenever
discount rates are adjusted to reflect a different amount of leverage. Even when adjusted present
value methods are used to take into account the tax saving from debt, this relationship may first
be used to derive the unlevered required return. The original ME formula that relates Ru and
RL was derived with an informal treatment of risky debt and no investor taxes. It is dependent
upon the "cost of debt" where this could be interpreted either as the yield or the expected return.
For clarity, we define the yield on the debt as YD, and the expected return on the debt as RD.^
The difference is the effect of expected default.^ Miles and Ezzell (1980) present the relationship
between Ry and Ri as
„ „ LYDTC{\+RU)
^ = ^ ( 7 )
where their "cost of debt" has been interpreted here as its yield. Brealey and Myers (2003)
generalize this to the case of investor taxes by using T* rather than TQ.
Sick (1990) derives a different relationship:*
RL R U r . (9)
I -I- KFE
The key difference, as noted by Sick, is that his result in Equation (9) involves the use of the
riskless equity rate rather than the cost of debt that is in Equation (8). If the investor tax rate is
set to zero, we see that Sick's formula also differs from ME's in Equation (7).
••in particular, Y,) is the coupon on debt issued at par.
'See Cooper and Davydenko (2007) for a more extensive discussion of this point.
'The notation in Sick (1990) is slightly different, but the result can be derived by simple substitution. Equation (9) is also
the formula derived by Taggart ( 1991 ) when debt is riskless.
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II. The Assumptions Underlying the Different Approaches
In this section, we show that the difference between the Sick (1990) and ME formulas concerns
an assumption about the tax treatment of insolvent firms. Sick assumes that an insolvent firm
will make a tax payment equal to the gain from writing off its debt multiplied by the tax rate. If
the write-off is total, the entire principal ofthe debt will be taxed when the firm defaults. As we
show below, the assumption implicit in the ME approach is that no such payment will be made.
The issue in choosing between the two approaches is, therefore, whether insolvent firms can be
expected to make such tax payments. At the end of this section, we discuss the factors that affect
this.
We show the impact ofthe different assumptions using a one-period two-state model. To focus
on the fundamental difference between the two approaches, in this illustration there are no investor
taxes. Later we derive the results including investor taxes. Table I demonstrates the valuation of
the debt tax shield under two alternative assumptions about the tax savings from interest. The
valuation is by no-arbitrage, using a riskless bond and the risky bond to span the tax saving.
Panel A shows the prices and payoffs ofthe riskless and risky bonds. The risky bond either makes
its promised payment ofl + YD if it does not default, or defaults completely.
Panel B indicates the valuation by no-arbitrage of the tax savings from interest assumed by
Sick (1990). The tax impact of borrowing is TcYp per dollar ofthe face value ofthe bond if the
company is solvent, but the company pays Tc as a consequence ofthe debt if it defaults. The latter
payment is caused by the gain from writing oif the bond. To replicate the tax consequences ofthe
debt, the replicating portfolio consists of an amount Tc ofthe risky bond and riskless borrowing
of Tc/(1 + RF). This gives the same payoff as the incremental tax effect ofthe debt. The value
ofthe tax saving, PVTSs, is simply the value of this replicating portfolio:
PVTSs = TcRp/il + RF). (10)
Panel C shows the no-arbitrage valuation ofthe ME tax savings from interest. This differs from
the Sick (1990) tax savings in that there is no tax payment when the company is in default, as the
company is assumed to pay no tax in this state. The replicating portfolio consists of TCYD/{\ -\-
YD) invested in the risky bond. The resulting value ofthe tax shield from debt is simply the value
of this investment:
PVTSME ^ TcYo/il + YD). (11)
Although Table I uses a single-period model, this valuation procedure is also correct in the
multi-period setting we use in the remainder of this paper.
As seen above, both polar approaches generate simple results at the expense of simplifying
assumptions. The correct treatment in practice will depend on which is closer to the actual tax
impact of debt for insolvent companies. An important factor here is how the tax code treats debt
write-downs. As discussed by Miller (1991), in the United States, a cancellation of indebtedness
(COD) gives rise to a tax liability (IRC Section 61(a)(12)). This is also what is assumed by Sick
(1990), but not by the ME approach. However, the tax code also grants an exception from tax on
COD if the firm is insolvent in the sense that liabilities exceed assets (see Miller, 1991; United
States Tax Court, 2006).' Thus, tax on COD is an issue only for firms seeking debt forgiveness
'Firms for which tax on COD is an issue can avoid the tax by reorganizing in Chapter 11 (Miller, 1991). The evidence
suggests though that tax on COD is not an issue for many firms that reorganize in Chapter 11. For example, Betker ( 1995)
finds that in none ofthe 41 pre-packaged Chapter 1 l's in his sample would the firm actually incur tax on COD, and
Gilson (1997) provides some evidence that potential tax on COD does not affect the amount of debt reductions incurred
by reorganizing distressed firms.
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Table I. Illustration of the Difference in Tax Shield Valuation with Alternative
Approaches to the Tax Treatment of Insolvent Firms
Time 0 Value Time 1 Cash Flow
If Solvent If Insolvent
Panel A. Primitive Assets
Riskless asset 1 \ -\- RF \ + RF
Bond 1 \-\-YD • 0
Panel B. No-Arbitrage Valuation of Tax Saving with Tax Payment in Insolvency (Sick, 1990)
Tax saving PVTSs Te YD -Te
Replicating portfolio Te - Tel{\ -h RF) Te (1 -I- YD) - Te -Te
Panel C. No-Arbitrage Valuation of Tax Saving with No Tax Payment in Insolvency (Miles and Ezzell, 1980)
Tax saving PVTSME/BM TeYp 0
Replicating portfolio 7'C>'D/(1 + >'D) TeYD 0
without being legally insolvent. Both the Sick and ME approaches implicitly assume that debt
write-downs occur only in the case of insolvency. Consequently, Sick's approach is not consistent
with US tax law, whereas the ME approach is.
In the remainder of this paper, we derive valuation formulas under the ME assumption. There-
fore, we assume that the tax savings from risky debt should be valued using Equation (11). As
illustrated in Table I, this represents one extreme assumption about the treatment of the COD.
This assumption is closer to the US Tax Code than Sick's (1990) assumption, but the latter may
be more appropriate in other jurisdictions.
Sick's (1990) analysis may be relevant in jurisdictions where tax law does not provide an
exception from tax on COD to insolvent firms. In such cases, Sick's approach is correct if
insolvent firms are in tax-paying positions. However, based on US evidence, insolvent firms
typically do not pay taxes (Gilson, 1997). Therefore, the principal mechanism for the incre-
mental tax payment from COD in the insolvent state that Sick assumes must be a reduction in
the value of carried-forward tax losses. Whether this is realistic depends on a variety of fac-
tors, including the efficiency of the market for tax loss transfers. Imperfections in this market
would imply that Sick's approach needs modification even when COD is taxed when the firm is
insolvent.
The ME approach is most relevant in jurisdictions such as in the United States where tax law
provides an exception from tax on COD for insolvent firms. However, if default implies only a
partial loss on the bond, the ME approach is also incomplete in that setting. In general, it is likely
that the correct treatment lies somewhere between the two polar cases. ^
'There is an interesting theoretical problem with the combination of a constant leverage policy and default. If a firm
continuously maintains a constant leverage ratio and there are no jumps in its value, it will never default. Of course,
default is possible without jumps if leverage is adjusted only periodically, as in the original setup of Miles and Ezzell
(1980).
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III. The Relationship between Leveraged and Unleveraged Rates
Appendix A demonstrates that under the standard ME assumptions with the inclusion of risky
debt and investor taxes, the relationship between RL and Ry is:
(12)
For instance, if T* = Tc because there are no investor taxes, this formula is equal to the standard
ME result in Equation (7). The difference from Brealey and Myers' (1988) expression. Equation
(8), lies in the second and third terms in square brackets. They do not include these terms in their
intuitively derived expression with investor taxes.
If the debt is riskless, then YQ — Rf and
This is the expression given in Sick (1990) for risky debt and in Taggart (1991) for riskless debt.
Thus, the difference from Sick's results lies in the treatment of the debt yield spread, as discussed
above.
If the period between rebalancing the leverage becomes short. Equation (12) converges to:
^ ^ (14)
Both this simplified expression and the more complex formula in Equation (12) are approxima-
tions. Neither exactly reflects the actual leverage policies that firms follow, and it is not clear
which is closer to the way that companies actually determine their leverage over time. Simplicity
and ease of use thus favors Equation (14) rather than Equation (12) as the formula to use with
risky debt and investor taxes. As we illustrate below, the numerical differences between these two
formulas are likely to be small in practice.
A. Differences Arising from Using Different Formulas
To evaluate the extent of the differences arising from using various formulas, we examine three
types of firms. These are shown in Table II, Panel A. The first firm, in Cases 1 and 4, has a typical
amount of leverage and a debt spread of 1%. The second firm, shown in Cases 2 and 5, has higher
leverage and a debt spread of 2%. The third firm, in Cases 3 and 6, has very high leverage and a
debt spread of 3%. All firms have an unleveraged cost of capital of 8%. The general parameters
are a riskless rate of 4%, a corporate tax rate of 40%, and a marginal investor tax rate on debt of
40%. In Cases 1-3, the tax savings from debt, T*, is the full corporate tax rate, whereas in Cases
3-6, it is half the corporate tax rate. We compute RL from Equation (12) and compare the values
given by other formulas.
Panel B demonstrates the differences resulting from the use of three other formulas. The first,
shown in Row A, is the formula given in Brealey and Myers (1988) in Equation (8). When the tax
savings is equal to the full corporate tax rate, this is identical to our formula. The main error in
the formula arises because it does not treat investor taxes properly, which becomes an issue when
T* does not equal Tc. This error is particularly large when the leverage is high. For example, in
Case 6, the error is a quarter of 1%, enough to cause significant errors in company valuation.
30%
5%
40%
7.38%
60%
6%
40%
6.53%
80%
7%
40%
5.74%
30%
5%
20%
1.11%
60%
6%
20%
7.44%
80%
7%
20%
7.14%
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Table II. Differences Resulting from Different Formulas for Ri
This table shows the differences arising from using different formulas to calculate the leveraged cost of
capital, Ri. The unlevered cost of capital, Ru, is 8% and other variables are: Rp = 4%, Tc = 40%, Tpo =
40%. Panel A shows three different firms, with leverages of 30%, 60%, and 80% and debt costs of 5%,
6%, and 7% respectively The tax saving from interest, T*, is assumed to be either 40% or 20%, which is
equivalent to setting Tp^ = 40% or 20%, respectively. The benchmark values ofRi in Panel A are calculated
using Equation (12). Panel B rows A, B, and C show the deviations in Ri from the benchmark (alternative
formula less benchmark) resulting from using the alternatives (8), (9), and (14), respectively.
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
Panel A. Inputs
L
RD
r
Benchmark Ri
Panel B. Deviations from Benchmark Ri Resulting from the Use of Different Formulas
A. BM 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.07% -0.18% -0.27%
B. Sick/Taggart 0.12% 0.47% 0.93% 0.04% 0.18% 0.35%
C. Continuous approximation 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.01% 0.02% 0.02%
Row B indicates the difference arising frotn using the Sick (1990) formula in Equation (9).
This is the same as Taggart's (1991) formula in Equation (13) that assumes risk-free debt. Here
the differences are larger, especially when the debt spread is high. For example, in Case 3 where
the tax advantage to debt is at its maximum, the difference is almost a full percentage point. The
difference occurs because of the different treatment of the debt spread, as discussed above.
Row C demonstrates the error when using continuous approximation in Equation (14) rather
than the discrete formula in Equation (12). This error is small, indicating that the extra complexity
of the formulas that assume discrete adjustment of leverage is unnecessary. The continuous
expression in Equation (14) has the merits of being simple, very close to the discrete adjustment
formula in Equation (12), and easy to use to convert RL to Ru as well as vice versa.
IV. Implementation Using the CAPM
A common approach is to use formulas for tax-adjusted discount rates in conjunction with
the CAPM. For instance, we first estimate the equity beta and unlever it to get the asset beta,
then calculate Ru using the CAPM, and finally calculate RL using one of the formulas above.
Alternatively, we calculate RL as the weighted average cost of capital by plugging equity and debt
betas into the CAPM. From that we can infer Ru and perhaps calculate new /f¿'s for different
leverage ratios. In this section, we derive formulas for the implementation using the CAPM that
are consistent with Equation (14).
A. The CAPM with Investor Taxes
The consensus investor will set returns so that the ratios of expected excess return to systematic
risk of all assets are equal on an after-investor-tax basis. This means that the standard version
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of the CAPM, where returns and betas are measured before investor taxes, will be affected by
investor tax rates. Appendix B reveals that the version of the CAPM that is consistent with the
assumptions about tax that determine T* is:
RE = RFE+ßEP, (15)
where Rg is the expected rate of equity return before investor taxes, ßß is the beta of the equity,
and
P = RM-RFE. (16)
Here RM is measured in the standard way, using returns before investor taxes. Betas are also
measured in the standard way, using pre-tax returns.^
Note that only if T* = Tc (or, equivalently, TpE = TPD), as assumed for the example in
Modigliani and Miller (1963), is the standard version of the CAPM, with an intercept equal to
Rf, valid. In contrast, the Miller (1977) view that T* - 0 corresponds to a CAPM where the
intercept is /?F(1 — Tc). A similar effect can be seen in the formula for the required return on
unlevered assets:'"
Ra = RfE+ßuP- (17)
As previously pointed out by Sick (1990) (see also Benninga and Sarig, 2003), the required
return on debt follows a different version of the CAPM because the tax treatment of debt and
equity differ in all cases other than the standard Modigliani and Miller (1963) case:
RD:=.Rp+ßDP. (18)
Regardless of the assumption about taxes, the pre-tax CAPM holds for debt as all debt is taxed in
the same way. ' '
B. The WACC and the Asset Beta
The textbook WACC relationship is:
WACC,e.,took = RD{\ - Tc)L + REO- - L). (19)
'Describing the CAPM with Equations ( 15) and (16) assumes that the market portfolio consists of equities only. Alterna-
tively, and perhaps more correctly, we could let the market portfolio exist of all risky assets. In this case, P would have to
be replaced hy P = R'^ — RF(\ — Tpo), where R'^ is the expected after-tax return on the market, and betas would have
to be measured with respect to R'^,. See Appendix B.
'"Care must be taken to distinguish between the unlevered beta, ßu, and the beta of the firm value given by the sum of
debt and equity. The latter is affected by the beta of the tax savings, as we discuss below.
"One issue here, which Equation (18) ignores, is that in case of insolvency, there will be a capital loss on debt that will
give rise to a tax savings equal to the loss x the capital gains tax rate (as we have assumed in deriving Equation (12),
where the capital gains tax rate is TPE). The correct effective tax rate on risky debt is a weighted average between the tax
rate on interest income, Tpo and the capital gains rate. If we call this rate tpd, then we would obtain the following pre-tax
CAPM for risky debt: Ro = RFD + /*DP, where Äfo =Äf (1 — Tp[,)l{\— Xp¿). There is another complexity with risky debt.
It is not clear that the entire premium over the riskless rate is due to beta risk. We do not deal with this issue here. See
Cooper and Davydenko (2007) for a discussion.
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This assumes that next period's expected tax saving to the corporation per unit of debt in the
current period is RDTC- More generally, the tax saving is YoTc if the company is solvent, and
less if it is not. Under the assumption underlying our analysis (see Section III), solvency occurs
with probability p and the tax saving is zero in case of insolvency. Thus, the correct WACC
is
WACC = {RD - PYDTC)L + RE{¡ - L). (20)
Furthermore, (1 + RD) = p{\ •¥ YD). Using this relation, we can rewrite the formula for the
WACC as
WACC = RD{1- TC)L + RE{1-L)- ^—^ TcL. (21 )
1 + ¡D
Notice that the third term is positive, but likely to be small in practice. '^  Thus, the textbook WACC
overstates the true WACC by a small term that depends on the probability of default, as reflected
in the diflference between the yield and the expected rate of return on the debt.
Under the ME assumptions, the WACC as given by Equation (20) is equal to /?¿. Using the
continuous rebalancing assumption (see Equation (14)):
- Tc)L + RE{\ - L ) - ^^y^TcL = Ry - LT*YD\^^. (22)
I + ID 1 — y *
Now define So to be the "yield spread," that is,
SD = YD-RF- (23)
Using this definition and substituting RE, RU, and RD from Equations (15), (17), and (18),
respectively, into (22), we get that the unlevered asset beta is
i^ ) (24)
where P is the risk premium (as given in Equation (16)). The final term is small and can be
ignored in most practical cases, resulting in the following formula for the asset beta:
ßu ^ ßoL^^^ + ßEi^ - L). (25)
We suggest using this asset beta formula in the presence of personal taxes and risky debt. The
approximation is better the lower is the difference between YD and RD, when these are equal,
SD/P equals ßD and the third term in Equation (24) is zero, thus giving Equation (25) exactly. If
third term in Equation (21) may have significant impact when leverage is "high," which may also be associated
with a large difference between Yp and Rp.
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T* = Tc (or, equivalently TPE = Tpo, see Equation (5)), Equation (25) is equal to the standard
asset beta equation: '^
ßu = ßoL + ßsil - L). (26)
We can intuitively understand the relationships between betas in the following way. The lever-
aged firm's operating assets are the same as those for the all-equity firm. But the leveraged
firm generates extra value through the tax savings from interest and changes the after-tax risk
of the cash flow by channeling some of it to debtholders rather than equityholders changing the
associated tax treatment. The weighted average of the equity beta and the tax-adjusted debt beta
for the leveraged firm must equal the asset beta adjusted for the effect of the tax savings:
—ßE + -rrßD-. 7^— = y ßu + -r-
Vi VL í - TpE VL VL
where E is the value of the equity, D the value of the debt, Vi—E + D, VTS is the value of the tax
shield, and jo rs is its beta. The value K¿ — Vjs is the all-equity value of the firm, which has beta
equal to ßu. The adjustment to the debt beta reflects the fact that the differential tax treatment of
debt and equity results in a change in beta when cash flow is switched from equity to debt, even
apart from the effect on the value of the firm. With the ME assumptions and continuous debt
rebalancing, ßjs is approximately equal to ßu, giving Equation (25).'''
V. Conclusion
We have presented tax-adjusted discount rates and asset beta formulas with a constant debt
to value leverage policy, investor taxes, and risky debt. We have compared our formula for tax-
adjusted discount rates with those of Miles and Ezzell (1980), who do not allow for investor
taxes; Sick (1990) and Brealey and Myers (1988), who include both risky debt and investor
taxes; and Taggart (1991), who assumes risk-free debt. Differences arise because of different
assumptions about the tax system (Sick, 1990 ) or missing tax effects (Brealey and Myers, 1988).
Using realistic parameter values, we have shown that differences between these formulas can
be almost a full percentage point at high leverage levels. Given our assumptions, the correct
formula, assuming discrete rebalancing of debt, is complex. However, the approximation based
on continuous rebalancing is very accurate:
| ^ . (28)
This approximation has the merits of being simple, very close to the discrete adjustment formula,
and easy to use to convert Ri to Ru as well as vice versa. We have also presented the formulas
'^Further to the discussion in Footnote 9, note that Equation (26) does not rely on an assumption that the market portfolio
consists only of equities. For when Tp^ = Tpo, the CAPM is described by Equations (15) and (16), also when the market
portfolio includes debt, and Rpg = Rp.
'"In general, with the ME debt policy, ßrs and ßu are not equal due to discrete rebalancing and also the effect of debt
default (Sick, 1990). With continuous rebalancing, ;3 ^  andßu will be approximately equal. However, the effect of default
still may cause a small difference, as reflected by the extra (third) term in Equation (24).
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for asset betas and implementation using the CAPM that are consistent with this. The formula
we suggest for the asset beta in the presence of personal taxes is
^ ^ L ) . (29)
This is consistent with Equation (28) when a small term involving the difference between the
promised yield and expected return on debt is ignored.
These results are based on the assumption that the firm does not pay tax on the write-off of its
debt if it defaults. The alternative assumption, that it does pay this tax, results in the formulas
given by Sick (1990). Which formula is appropriate in a given situation depends, to a large
extent, on the tax treatment of COD. As we have discussed, in the United States, there is no tax
on COD for firms that are legally insolvent. Thus, in a US context, the approach taken in this
paper is arguably the appropriate one. Our formulas assume complete insolvency (i.e., complete
cancellation of debt). An important avenue for further research is to accommodate partial default
into a framework where there is no tax on COD.
Appendix A: Proof of the Relationship between RL and Ru
We prove the relationship between RL and Ru by induction. Let T be the terminal date of the
firm and denote the expected, as of date ^ — 1, cash flow at date T by Cj. At date T — 1, the
ex-cash flow unleveraged value is
VUT-\=CT{\-TC)/{\+RU). (Al)
Note that the expected after-tax cash flow to investors at date T is
VUT-\TPE. (A2)
The second term represents the after-tax cash flow arising from the tax deduction associated
with the purchase price, VUT-\, at date T - 1. We assume that if there is a capital loss on
the investment in the current firm, the investor can use this to ofl'set gains elsewhere. This tax
deduction is implicitly taken care of by Ry in Equation (Al).
Note that we are assuming that capital gains taxes are paid on a mark-to-market basis and
that the same tax rate applies to capital gains and dividends. The use of separate tax rates on
capital gains and equity income would complicate the analysis at this point, as would the use
of an "as-realized" rule for capital gains. The implications of different capital gains and income
taxation are not our main focus, so we use the most simple assumption. '^
In the levered case, there are two additional sources of cash flows. First, there is the tax saving
from the tax deductibility of interest payments. This equals YDLVLT-ITS in case of solvency and
zero otherwise. Under our assumptions, this is valued by replicating the after-tax cash flows for
the investor using a combination of the risky bond and the riskless asset. Using the procedure in
Table I, but including investor taxes, gives the value shown as the second term in Equation (A3)
"There is an emerging literature that introduces realistic treatment of capital gains taxes into the capital structure literature
(see Lewellen and Lewellen, 2005). The implications of their results for practical valuation are not yet clear.
376 Financial Management » Summer 2008
as the value of the interest tax shield. '* Second, investors get an extra tax deduction from capital
gains of ViT-\ — VuT-\, the difference between the tax basis of the levered and unlevered firms.
This gives rise to an extra after-tax cash flow of (F¿r_i — VUT-\)TPE, using a capital gains tax
rate of Tpg. Since this is riskless, it should be discounted at RF{ 1 - Tpo). The value of the levered
firm is therefore:
„ ^ LVLT-XYDTS{\ + RF) ^ (VLT-I- VUT-X)TPE
VLT-\ = v + *+ n -L V VI -L p n T Y \ * 1 , p n
(1 + YD)(Í + «f(l - TpD)) 1 + RF\} -
Using Equations (4) and (6), we can rearrange Equation (A3) as:
At time T — \,Ri and Ru are defined by:
-i (A5)
- (A6)
Thus, F(/r-i = ViT-\(\ + ^¿)/(l + ÄÜ)- Substituting this into (A4), we get:
Ru)l{\ + YD)\[{\ - 7b)/(l - r*)]Kl + RF)I{\ + RFE)1 (A7)
We will now establish the generality of this formula. Consider first time T — 2. Consider the
expected cash flow at T — 1, Cr_i, and the continuation value, VLT-\, as two separate, but equally
levered flows. Denote their values at 7 - 2 by it; T-I and WT-I, respectively. The same argument as
ahove establishes that u;7-_2 = Cr-i (1 - Tc)l{\ -|-/f¿), with/?¿ given by Equation (A7). Now, we
have established above that K¿r-i is proportional to VUT-\- Therefore, its unleveraged value at
r — 2 is Kir_i/(1 -\- Ru)- Thus, using the same argument as above, the leveraged value of F¿r-i
at r - 2 is WT-2 — VLT-\I{^ + RL), with Ri given by Equation (A7). This establishes that:
'^-^ \+R {\+Rf
This argument can be repeated for arbitrary T - t, which establishes the generality of Equation
(A7).
Appendix B. Relationships between Betas and Returns
The representative investor sets returns so that after-tax returns are in equilibrium. However,
the CAPM is usually stated in terms of pre-tax betas and risk premia. This appendix uses the
"The replicating portfolio is now: TSYBI[(\ + YD){\ - Tpo)] in the risky bond, and -[TSYDTPD/[O + Yo){l - TPD){\ +
Rp(l — TPD))] in the risk-free bond. Adding these two quantities gives the reported value of the tax deductibility of
interest payments (since the risky and riskless bonds both have a price of 1).
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after-tax CAPM to derive the pre-tax version that is consistent with the assumptions about the
tax saving on debt.
Equilibrium requires that expected rates of return are the same after tax for all investments with
the same exposure to systematic risk. Specifically, the after-tax CAPM implies that:
(Bl)
where P' is the post-tax market risk premium:
R'l^ is the post-tax return on the market portfolio (which would include equities as well as risky
debt). Betas in Equation (Bl) are written with a prime to indicate that they are post-tax betas.
Denoting betas of pre-tax returns with respect to the post-tax market portfolio by a "hat," we
have:
cov(^^(ir;.^),^;^) c o v ( ^ ^ ^ _ -
PE = . , ,7,, . = (1 - TPE) ~ = (1 - TpE)ßE- (B2)
Var(/?;) Var(/^;)
Here ßE is the beta of the pre-tax return on equity with respect to the after-tax return on the
market. Similarly:
(B3)
and
Var(/?;^) Var(/^ ;^ )^
Using these betas provides the following expressions for the pre-tax returns on equity and debt:
RE^RFE+ßEP' (B5)
Ru = RFE + ßuP' (B6)
h ' (B7)
Most empirical observations about risk premia are made in terms of pre-tax returns. Going from
P' to a pre-tax risk premium is clearly not straightforward when the market portfolio consists of
assets that are taxed at different rates.
As a simplification, let us assume that the market portfolio (i.e., the priced factor) consists only
of equities. Then:
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P' = RMÍI - TPE) - RFÍI - Tpo) = RM{^ - TPE) - RFE{\ - TPE), ( B 8 )
where RM is the pre-tax expected rate of return on the market portfolio. Furthermore,
1 Cov(^e,^M)^ 1
\-TpE Var(^M) 1 - T'PE
where /^^ is the beta of the pre-tax return on equity with respect to the pre-tax return on the
market. This is the beta one normally works with in most applications. Similarly:
and
1 Ti^PD- (Bll)
1 T1 - TpE Var(/?Ai) 1 - TpE
Substituting into (B5)-(B7), we get:
(B12)
(B13)
(B14)
where:
P = RM-RFE (B15)
is the equity risk premium based on pre-tax returns on the market. Note, however, that the premium
is measured relative to the tax-adjusted riskless equity rate, RFE, rather than the pre-tax rate RF. B
References
Berminga, S. and O. Sarig, 2003, "Risk, Returns, and Values in the Presence of Differential Taxation,"
Journal of Banking and Finance 27, 1123-1138.
Betker, B., 1995, "An Empirical Examination of Prepackaged Bankruptcy," Financial Management 24,
3-18.
Brealey, R.A. and S.C. Myers, 2003, Principles of Corporate Finance, 7th ed.. New York, NY, McGraw-Hill.
Brealey, R.A. and S.C. Myers, 1988, Principles of Corporate Finance, 3rd ed.. New York, NY, McGraw-Hill.
Cooper, I.A. and S. Davydenko, 2007, "Estimating the Cost of Risky Debt," Journal of Applied Corporate
Finance \9, 9,1-9,6.
Cooper, I.A. and K.G. Nyborg, 2006, "The Value of Tax Shields is Equal to the Present Value of Tax
Shields," Journal of Financial Economics 81,215-225.
Cooper & Nyborg • Tax-Adjusted Discount Rates with Investor Taxes and Risky Debt 379
Emery, D.R. and A.K. Gehr, Jr., 1988, "Tax Options, Capital Structure, and Miller Equilibrium: A Numerical
Illustration," Financial Management 17, 30-40.
Fama, E.F. and K..R. French, 1998, "Taxes, Financing and Firm Value," Journal of Finance 53, 879-843.
Fernandez, P., 2004, "The Value of Tax Shields is Not Equal to the Present Value of Tax Shields," Journat
of Financial Economics 73, 145-165.
Gilson, S.C, 1997, "Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Financially Distressed
Firms," Journat of Finance 52, 161 -196.
Graham, J.R., 2000, "How Big are the Tax Benefits oí DthtT Journal of Finance 55, 1901-1941.
Kemsiey, D. and D. Nissim, 2002, "Valuation of the Debt Tax Shield," Jowr«a/ of Finance 57, 2045-2073.
Lewellen, J. and K. Lewellen, 2005, "Taxes and Financial Decisions," Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Working Paper.
Miles, J. and J.R. Ezzell, 1980, "The Weighted Average Cost of Capital, Perfect Capital Markets and Project
Life: A Chriñcaüon," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 15, 719-730.
Miller, M.H., 1991, "Tax Obstacles to Voluntary Corporate Restructuring," Journat of Applied Corporate
Finance 4, 20-23.
Miller, M.H., 1977, "Debt and Taxes " Journal of Finance 32, 261-276.
Modigliani, F. and M.H. Miller, 1963, "Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction,"
American Economic Review 53, 433-443.
Rajan, R.G. and L. Zingales, 1995, "What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from
International Data," Journat of Finance 50, 1421-1460.
Sick, G.A., 1990, "Tax-Adjusted Discount Rates," Management Science 36, 1432-1450.
Taggart, R.A., 1991, "Consistent Valuation and Cost of Capital Expressions with Corporate and Personal
Taxes," Financiat Management 20, 8-20.
United States Tax Court, Judge Goeke, 2006, TC. Memo. 2006-61, Docket No. 5213-04, Mazhar Tabrezi,
f.k.a. Agha Hussain, and Sajida Razvi, Petitioners v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent.

